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1. Introduction 
Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs) play a prominent role in modern financial markets. 
Globalization and the increasing complexity of investment products have triggered a growing 
demand for widely recognised risk assessment. Sovereign ratings serve as a basis for 
evaluating the creditworthiness of a country, and thereby influence long-term investment and 
lending decisions across borders. Rating downgrades have major implications for financial 
markets and institutions, including rising costs of credit and hindered market access (e.g. BIS, 
2011; Alsakka, ap Gwilym, and Vu, 2014; Correa, Lee, Sapriza, and Suarez, 2014).  
 The global financial crisis brought CRAs renewed publicity and ongoing scrutiny by 
regulators. CRAs were blamed for worsening economic conditions by downgrading some 
sovereigns too quickly and too severely. The overreliance on ratings by market participants 
led to cliff effects whereby downgrades had a disproportionate effect. The situation in Europe 
has further emphasised the hazardous effects of negative spillovers while highlighting 
interconnectedness between international financial institutions (e.g. Arezki, Candelon, and 
Sy, 2011). The influence of ratings on global financial stability has become a major concern.
 In 2009, the European Commission (EC) implemented a new set of regulations aimed at 
CRAs including registration procedures, governance requirements, internal controls, 
disclosure rules and improvements in rating methodologies (CRA I Regulation).1 This 
regulation was amended in May 2011 (CRA II Regulation) and in November 2011 (CRA III 
Regulation). The responsibility for supervising and certifying CRAs was handed to the 
European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) in July 2011. This paper draws attention 
to the disclosure rules with particular focus on Article 10 (5) of the EU Regulation 
1060/2009, which requires that when a CRA issues an unsolicited rating, it needs to be 
                                                        
1 Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 on credit 
rating agencies. 
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identified as such.2 As a result of implementing the Article in February 2011, S&P disclosed 
the conversion to unsolicited status of 14 rated sovereign governments (S&P, 2011a, b, c). 
Unsolicited ratings are one of the most controversial features of the CRA business. Prior 
literature (e.g. Poon, Lee, and Gup, 2009; Bannier, Behr and Güttler, 2010; Van Roy, 2013) 
finds that banks and corporations rated on an unsolicited basis have significantly lower 
ratings. Concerns exist that unsolicited ratings are biased downward because CRAs are not 
compensated for their service. Additionally, policymakers have focused on this feature, 
because both solicited and unsolicited ratings are permitted for some regulatory uses. 
 The broad aim of this paper is to examine whether the disclosure rule on solicitation status 
achieves its objective of more credible rating services or has unintended consequences. 
Specifically, we investigate whether conversion to sovereign unsolicited rating status 
(induced by disclosure rules) results in lower bank ratings (in the re-designated unsolicited 
sovereign states). Previous literature on the controversies related to unsolicited (non-
sovereign) ratings provides a theoretical framework (see Section 2.3). Additionally, it is well 
known that sovereign risk spills over to financial institutions through many channels (BIS, 
2011; De Bruyckere, Gerhardt, Schepens, and Vennet, 2013; Alsakka, et al., 2014). Studying 
whether the mandatory disclosed unsolicited status of sovereign ratings transmits risk to 
banks is a key motivation for this research.  
 The novelty of this study derives from building on three streams of research, which 
meaningfully overlap and result in a synergy which has not been previously explored. The 
first theme relates to the unique opportunity to investigate the dynamics of rating solicitation 
for sovereigns. To the best of our knowledge, no prior study has investigated the rationale 
and impact of rating solicitation status for sovereigns. The existing literature concentrates on 
the solicitation of corporate and bank ratings (Poon, 2003; Poon et al., 2009; Bannier et al., 
                                                        
2 A solicited rating is a rating requested by the issuer who incurs the cost of the appraisal. An unanticipated (by 
the issuer) assessment by the CRA using public information about the issuer is known as an unsolicited rating. 
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2010; Van Roy, 2013) yet it does not include any study of solicitation conversions. The 
second theme relates to the impact of sovereign ratings on bank ratings through the rating 
channel. This aspect of the paper builds on recent work (Alsakka et al., 2014; Huang and 
Shen, 2015) while adding a new dimension to the type of constraints imposed by sovereigns 
on banks via rating ceilings.  
 Thirdly, this paper considers the influence of the recent EU CRA regulation. To the best of 
our knowledge, there is no published empirical work on the effects of enhanced disclosure by 
CRAs introduced since 2009. Jorion, Liu, and Shi (2005) study the effect of U.S. Regulation 
Fair Disclosure (Reg FD), introduced in 2000, and find that both positive and negative rating 
changes have a stronger informational effect on stock prices after the Reg FD took effect. 
Poon and Evans (2013) find that the impact of rating downgrades on bond yield premia (after 
Reg FD) depends on the size of the firm. Studies on other forms of rating-related regulation 
focus on periods prior to the EU CRA regulation (e.g. Becker and Milbourn (2011) utilize a 
U.S. sample from 1995 to 2006).  
 The paper uses a large sample of 147 banks rated by S&P incorporated in 42 countries in 
Europe, Asia-Pacific and Latin America for the period between 2006 and 2013. We apply an 
ordered probit model estimation, along with many robustness checks including placebo tests 
and matching exercises. We strongly endeavour to rule out the possibility of sample selection 
bias or that the observed phenomenon arises from events other than the adoption of EU 
disclosure rules for CRAs.          
 The results strongly suggest that disclosure of unsolicited sovereign status adversely 
influences bank ratings through the rating channel. Banks in countries converted to 
unsolicited status are more likely to be downgraded and less likely to be upgraded compared 
with banks in sovereigns which retained solicited ratings at all times. The marginal effects 
(MEs) analysis suggests that the former banks are 1.73%, 0.74% and 0.47% more likely to be 
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downgraded by 1, 2 and ≥ 3 Comprehensive Credit Rating (CCR) points respectively.3 The 
significance of the MEs should be considered in relation to the total number of bank 
(sovereign) rating downgrades which represent 3.28% (2.73%) of all observations. 
Additionally, the analysis confirms a strong ceiling effect between sovereigns and banks.
 These findings have clear policy implications for regulators and banks, since there are 
potential costs to the institutions and the wider economies through this rating ceiling effect. 
The phenomenon represents an unintended consequence of regulation, and suggests a need 
for greater awareness of CRA rating policies in designing future regulation. Policymakers 
should take a closer look at unsolicited sovereign ratings and their implications. The findings 
of this study reveal an undesirable impact of recent regulatory developments on the European 
economy and will be informative in shaping future proposals.    
 The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 draws from prior theoretical and empirical 
literature to frame the research questions and the testable hypothesis. The data and descriptive 
statistics are discussed in Section 3. Section 4 discusses research methodologies, Sections 5 
and 6 present the empirical results and Section 7 concludes the study. 
 
2. Literature review and hypothesis development 
2.1. Bank credit ratings 
Reliance on bank ratings has grown in recent years, partly driven by increased and 
more complex financial transactions and by disintermediation. Simultaneously, deregulation 
and innovation (e.g. securitisation, derivatives) resulted in banks being bigger, more 
concentrated, complex and closely linked with the capital markets (Hau, Langfield, and 
Marques-Ibanez, 2013). Bank ratings impact the cost of issuing senior unsecured debt, which 
is the most important type of funding for intermediaries in the long run (Wyman, 2011). Bank 
ratings also influence the distribution of capital, risk and liquidity creation, e.g. bank ratings 
                                                        
3 These figures relate to outlook action, watch event, and downgrade by one notch or more. 
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are key determinants of the quality of banks’ portfolios, the quality of collateral to obtain 
liquidity from central banks, and capital adequacy requirements. However, rating banks poses 
some difficulties for CRAs, given that banks are opaque and subject to a range of different 
risks. They are also exposed to asymmetric information and are under regulatory oversight. 
Bank ratings reflect creditworthiness and are based on a ‘through the cycle’ 
perspective. Prior literature shows that bank ratings are driven not only by bank-specific 
factors but also by the macroeconomic environment and potential external support from the 
government. Caporale, Matousek and Stewart (2012) show that bank ratings are affected by 
banks’ financial position and country of origin, whereby a bank in a less 
stable/developed/rich economy appears to have a lower rating. Shen, Huang, and Hasan 
(2012) show that banks with higher ratios of profitability, liquidity and capital adequacy and 
better ratios of efficiency (cost-to-income) and asset quality (loan loss provisions to net 
interest revenues) tend to be assigned higher ratings. The influence of financial ratios on bank 
ratings is greater in industrial or high-income countries than in emerging market countries. 
Hau et al. (2013) also find that bank characteristics significantly affect bank rating quality. 
They emphasise that the quality of banks’ ratings increase with more traditional banking 
activities, while CRAs assign more favourable ratings to large banks and those banks that 
provide CRAs with a large quantity of securities rating business. 
  Banks are different to most other corporations in that governments are more likely to 
assist them due to their systemic importance. Governments might also limit the financial 
flexibility of intermediaries through regulatory means. Hence, sovereign risk is considered as 
a key factor determining a bank rating (Poon et al., 2009; Shen et al., 2012; Huang and Shen, 
2015). Sovereign ratings typically represent an upper limit for the ratings assigned to non-
sovereign issuers in the country. Although the sovereign rating ceiling technically no longer 
exists, there is evidence that sovereign ratings strongly affect the ratings of non-sovereigns 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
6 
 
(Borensztein, Cowan, and Valenzuela, 2013), and banks very rarely pierce the sovereign 
ceiling. Shen et al. (2012) and Huang and Shen (2015) show that the sovereign rating acts as 
the ceiling for bank ratings. Williams, Alsakka and ap Gwilym (2013) and Alsakka et al. 
(2014) find that bank ratings are directly affected by sovereign rating signals, while Correa et 
al. (2014) show that sovereign rating downgrades have a strong effect on the returns of those 
banks which are likely to receive government support. Further, there are many examples 
when the CRAs explicitly link bank downgrades to prior sovereign rating downgrades.4 
 
2.2. Spillover channels 
In studying the close relationship between sovereign and bank ratings, we are interested in 
whether the rating solicitation status of the government has an effect on bank ratings. The 
spillover between sovereigns and banks, affecting the latter’s costs and funding opportunities, 
is known to transmit through four main channels: (i) asset holdings, (ii) collateral, (iii) 
government guarantees and (iv) ratings. Firstly, when banks hold sovereign debt they are 
faced with a loss in balance sheet value and overall profitability while funding becomes more 
expensive if the sovereign risk increases (BIS, 2011; Arezki et al., 2011; De Bruyckere et al., 
2013). Secondly, higher sovereign risk results in lower value of collateral available to banks 
when negotiating costs of funds e.g. with the central bank (Sy, 2009; BIS, 2011; De 
Bruyckere et al., 2013; Correa et al., 2014). Thirdly, any reduced creditworthiness of the 
sovereign lessens the funding opportunities for banks arising from implicit and explicit 
government guarantees. A weakened government position undermines the credibility of any 
support for banks (BIS, 2011; De Bruyckere et al., 2013).  
                                                        
4 For example, when S&P downgraded 15 Spanish banks’ ratings on 13 February 2012, they stated that the ‘The 
rating actions follow the lowering of the long- and short-term sovereign credit ratings on the Kingdom of Spain 
… published Jan. 13, 2012’. Similarly, on 10 February 2012, S&P lowered its ratings on 34 Italian financial 
institutions and stated that ‘the downgrades follow the lowering of the unsolicited long- and short-term 
sovereign credit ratings on the Republic of Italy … published Jan. 13, 2012.’ 
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The last channel relates to the fact that lower ratings of sovereigns are found to translate 
directly into lower bank ratings in that country (Alsakka et al., 2014; Huang and Shen, 2015). 
The spillover is known to occur for two reasons. Firstly, the lower sovereign ratings affect the 
cost of debt and equity funding. Arezki et al. (2011) show that sovereign rating changes 
affect bank stock index levels in Europe over the 2007–2010 period. Similarly, Caselli, 
Gandolfi, and Soana (2014) find evidence of significant bank losses following sovereign 
rating downgrades in the European market. Correa et al. (2014) find that banks which are 
expected to receive government support demonstrate lower stock returns after a sovereign 
rating downgrade, while Williams, Alsakka and ap Gwilym (2015) show that S&P actions 
induce a significant impact on bank valuations in emerging markets. Further, BIS (2011) 
emphasises that sovereign debt concerns push up banks’ funding costs. BIS (2011) show that 
in 2010 a large proportion (30%, or 120 basis points) of the spread, between the bond yield 
and the swap rate of similar maturity, on bank bonds reflected the conditions of the sovereign 
(in terms of sovereign ratings and CDS premium).  
Secondly, the ceiling effect arises because sovereigns have greater resources and policies 
at their disposal which mean that a higher non-sovereign rating is rarely justifiable. 
Borensztein et al. (2013) suggest that sovereign risk transmits onto non-sovereign issuers via 
the capital and other administrative controls and restrictive measures available to the 
government. Prohibitions against inflow and outflow of investment into the country (transfer 
and convertibility risk) restrain companies from repaying their external debt when the 
government reaches default or near default. In such a relationship, the non-sovereign debt 
always defaults when the state defaults, as it cannot access currency or transfer its funds 
outside the borders. Fitch (2012) suggest that sovereign actions such as altered regulated 
tariffs, deposit freezes, penalty taxation or expropriation are other reasons which justify the 
sovereign ceiling. Additionally, many banks participate in cross-holding claims of other 
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intermediaries across countries, and thereby become exposed to one another (Arezki et al., 
2011). Other channels include banking regulation, CDS contracts, and investment mandates 
(Sy, 2009). 
 
2.3. Theories of deflated unsolicited ratings 
 Theoretical insights on deflated unsolicited ratings arise under three main concepts: (i) 
self-selection bias, (ii) strategic conservatism, and (iii) blackmail theory.5 
Self-selection bias indicates that entities with unsolicited ratings who wish to convey a 
message that their creditworthiness is in fact better than stated will request solicited ratings. 
Once the rating improves, such entities benefit from a lower cost of capital.6 The overall 
reduction in cost explains the willingness of firms to incur fees for solicitation. Conversely, 
issuers which are aware of their weak creditworthiness, do not request and pay for a solicited 
rating (Fulghieri, Strobl, and Xia, 2014). Consequently, low quality issuers remain with their 
(relatively low) unsolicited ratings. Self-selection is thereby predicted to assist in reaching the 
most adequate credit appraisal for issuers regardless of the solicitation status. In our context, 
one could argue that a sovereign expecting a future rating downgrade would be more relaxed 
about an impending conversion to unsolicited status (e.g. not wishing to pay fees to a CRA if 
they consider a lower rating to be inevitable). 
The exact opposite of this premise arises under the strategic conservatism theory. Bannier 
et al. (2010) suggest that unsolicited ratings might be driven by CRAs’ “strategic 
considerations in the rating process” (p.264). When CRAs face a reduced information flow 
from an issuer, they might prefer to rate “too low” rather than “too favourably”. These 
                                                        
5 A fourth concept is the geographical discrimination theory. Li, Shin, and Moore (2006) conclude that raters 
outside Japan (Moody’s and S&P) do not reflect the keiretsu affiliation status. However, this is not applicable in 
this paper. 
6 According to Duff and Einig (2009), the CRAs allow borrowers to raise capital more cheaply by means of 
reducing asymmetric information between investors and debtors (i.e. CRAs reduce the risk premia of debt 
issues). 
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authors argue that issuers who share the same creditworthiness can be assigned different 
ratings, based on different solicitation status. Those who do not mandate for ratings receive a 
(lower) unsolicited rating whereas those who purchase a rating obtain a (higher) solicited 
rating (after controlling for the economic and financial conditions of the borrower). Likewise, 
the same rating level assigned to both solicited and unsolicited borrowers conveys a message 
that the unsolicited issuer is in fact less risky than implied by its rating. However, this does 
not assist a non-sovereign with solicited ratings in our context. In a scenario where an issuer 
converts to unsolicited status, the CRA does not have access to private information and might 
therefore decide to rate lower after the conversion in order to ensure conservatism. Also, prior 
literature has not considered how this effect may proceed under the sovereign-bank ceiling 
e.g. a bank paying for its solicited rating might face a downgrade attributable to the 
sovereign’s decision-making in opting for an unsolicited rating. 
The blackmail theory assumes that CRAs might persuade issuers to purchase ratings, 
otherwise threatening them (indirectly) by releasing disproportionately low unsolicited 
ratings. The rationale suggests that when the issuer is not transparent and does not disclose 
information, the risk assessment is difficult to perform and therefore downward biased ratings 
are not prone to being questioned by market participants (Van Roy, 2013). Ramakrishnan and 
Thakor (1984) stipulate that blackmail is not a tenable position for the CRAs, since their 
reputational capital plays a more important role than any short-term financial gains. However, 
Bar-Isaac and Shapiro (2013) and Opp, Opp, and Harris (2013) argue that the reputational 
concerns of CRAs change over the business cycle. CRAs increase their ratings quality in low 
points of the economic cycle and relax them during booms.  
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2.4. Hypothesis 
Two streams of literature discussed above provide a potential explanation for differentials 
between ratings of banks incorporated in solicited versus unsolicited sovereigns. Firstly, the 
theories of downward biased ratings for unsolicited non-sovereigns provide reasons to 
believe that the solicitation status of sovereigns will impact their credit ratings. Secondly, the 
evidence that bank ratings are influenced by sovereigns through the rating channel (e.g. BIS, 
2011; Alsakka et al., 2014) might lead the sovereign’s solicitation status to become a concern 
for banks. Under the interaction of these effects, we propose:  
Hypothesis: Bank ratings are more likely to be downgraded in countries whose sovereign 
rating status is converted to ‘unsolicited’.  
Such an effect has a negative impact on the funding costs of banks in that country. 
Investigation of the interplay between sovereigns and banks in this setting poses challenges in 
interpretation of the competing theories of unsolicited ratings (in Section 2.3). There is no 
literature (theoretical or empirical) which examines the issue of solicitation of sovereigns, not 
to mention the dynamics of any conversion in status. Individual governments do not reveal 
their rating subscription details and it is difficult to deduce whether self-selection plays a role 
in the status of sovereign ratings. On the other hand, sovereigns are relatively transparent in 
terms of their liability structures, unlike banks. Despite this, when a sovereign converts its 
solicitation status, the CRA might perceive a deficiency of soft information and start rating 
the sovereign more conservatively. The blackmail theory could offer a plausible explanation 
in a case where the issuer is less transparent (Van Roy, 2013). However, it is unlikely that a 
CRA providing services not only to a sovereign but also to a number of non-sovereigns in 
that constituency would threaten its current or potential clientele without genuine concern 
about harming its reputation (Ramakrishnan and Thakor, 1984).   
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3. Sample and data summary 
3.1. Solicitation status 
 The ratings and solicitation status for all sovereigns are obtained from S&P publications. 
On 24th February 2011, S&P (2011a, b, c) released reports on conversions of solicitation 
status for: 1) seven European countries (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom); 2) six Asia-Pacific countries (Australia, Cambodia, India, 
Japan, Singapore, Taiwan); and 3) U.S.A. The press releases from S&P state: ‘Standard & 
Poor's is converting its issuer and issue ratings on Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, 
Netherlands, Switzerland, the U.K., and the European Central Bank (ECB) to "unsolicited", 
in light of the new European Union regulations’ (S&P, 2011a), and ‘Standard & Poor's is 
converting its issuer and issue ratings on Australia, Cambodia, India, Japan, Singapore, and 
Taiwan to "unsolicited"’ (S&P, 2011b). In addition, all the issue ratings are then withdrawn 
shortly after the conversion of the issuer rating to ‘unsolicited’, which lends support to there 
being a fundamental change in S&P’s relation with these sovereigns.7 For example, S&P 
(2011b) states: ‘On May 24, 2011, we will withdraw all our issue ratings on the debt of 
Japan, Singapore, and Taiwan’. Further, Argentina’s solicitation status was converted on the 
4th April 2011 and was the final case arising from the regulatory requirements on disclosure 
during our sample period. U.S.A. is excluded from the reported results due to it having a high 
proportion (approx. 20%) of all S&P-rated financial institutions, which would distort the 
sample and dominate any evidence on the research question.8  
                                                        
7 The withdrawal of issue ratings shortly after the conversion of issuer rating to unsolicited status has no effect 
on our sample or our empirical analysis, because the sample only includes issuer ratings, and not issue ratings 
(see Section 3.2). 
8 Since U.S.A. is in the group of sovereigns whose ratings were converted to unsolicited, the ratio between 
sovereign/bank ratings (in our sample 13/74) would be unreasonably inflated in the denominator. With one extra 
sovereign but a significantly higher number of banks for that one country, any results would be driven by the US 
case. This is especially problematic because most US banks are rated several notches below the sovereign 
rating, and hence the sovereign-bank ceiling effect is far more muted for US banks. 
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 The new regulation (Article 10 (5) of the EU Regulation 1060/2009) is compulsory for 
CRAs, and is therefore applicable to all sovereigns rated by S&P. For banks operating in the 
EU to use sovereign ratings for regulatory purposes, the rating solicitation status (of all 
countries) must be disclosed.9 Hence, whenever there is no agreement with a rated 
government, the CRA must identify the rating as ‘unsolicited’. Any government may request 
to withdraw their ratings, but the CRA may elect to convert the rating to ‘unsolicited’ status 
rather than withdraw the rating (S&P Policy on Withdrawals, Suspensions, Discontinuances 
and Conversions, December 2014). Further, S&P may assign unsolicited credit ratings when 
it believes sufficient market interest exists for the rated entity (S&P Policy on Assignment of 
Credit Ratings, May 2014).10 
 There are two possible interpretations of the term ‘conversion’. One would be that the 
ratings were previously solicited or at least S&P had lines of communication with relevant 
government agencies. This view is supported by S&P’s choice of the word ‘converted’ and 
its withdrawal of issue-level ratings on these sovereigns. A second view would be that the 
ratings’ solicitation status was previously undisclosed and ‘converted’ refers solely to the 
public disclosure of being unsolicited. Even if the latter interpretation is true, the setup of this 
paper is unaffected and remains valid and appropriate. 
 
 
 
                                                        
9 For example, S&P (2011b) states: ‘These actions, in turn, follow new European Union regulations on credit 
ratings (Article 10(5) of EU Regulation 1060/2009), which address matters relating to the disclosure and 
presentation of credit ratings, requiring, among other things, that unsolicited credit ratings be identified as such. 
[.......] We are converting our issuer credit ratings on the six governments to "unsolicited," as we do not have 
rating agreements with these governments. Nevertheless, Standard & Poor's will continue to rate these 
governments and classify the ratings as unsolicited, as we believe that we have access to sufficient public 
information of reliable quality to support our analysis and ongoing surveillance, and because we believe there is 
significant market interest in these government ratings.’ 
10 All types of ratings (long-term, short-term, local-currency and foreign currency) are subject to the disclosure 
regulations. The press releases (S&P, 2011a, b) state: ‘Standard & Poor's is converting its issuer and issue 
ratings on [...] to "unsolicited",...’. However, the issue ratings are subsequently withdrawn.  
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3.2. Bank and rating data 
 The sample consists of monthly long-term foreign-currency issuer ratings for banks and 
sovereigns rated by S&P between January 2006 and January 2013.11 The ratings are observed 
on the 1st of each month. The scope of sovereign ratings is reflected in Section 3.1. Bank 
rating data is obtained from both S&P publications and the Interactive Data Credit Ratings 
International (CRI) publication. The sample only includes financial institutions because there 
is a far stronger link between sovereigns and banks than between sovereigns and corporations 
(see Borensztein et al., 2013; Huang and Shen, 2015). For example, corporates do not use 
sovereign bonds as collateral and for this reason are not equally affected by sovereign rating 
fluctuations. Also, for most countries (but not U.S.A.), banks are typically much more likely 
than corporations to be rated at the sovereign ceiling. The sample is narrowed by matching 
the credit rating data with the (annual frequency) financial and accounting statistics (see 
Section 4.1 and Table 3) of publicly listed banks in Europe, Asia-Pacific and Latin America 
for the period January 2006-January 2013 (sourced from Bankscope). The banks include 
commercial banks, savings banks, cooperative banks, real estate and mortgage banks, 
investment banks and other credit institutions.  
    The sample contains 147 S&P-rated listed banks in 42 countries.12 The studied 
phenomenon of a regulatory change provides grounds for applying a research design which is 
based on two groups: treatment and control. The treatment group consists of 13 sovereigns 
                                                        
11 It is standard practice in the literature on the sovereign ceiling effect (e.g. Borensztein et al., 2013; Williams et 
al., 2013; Alsakka et al., 2014) and on the determinants of bank ratings (e.g. Caporale et al., 2012; Shen et al., 
2012; Huang and Shen, 2015) to focus on long-term foreign-currency ratings. In our data sample, the local and 
foreign currency sovereign ratings are equal for all observations in the ‘treatment group’ and for the majority of 
cases in the ‘control group’. For the vast majority of bank observations in our data sample, the foreign and local 
currency ratings are equal. 
12 This is the final dataset used in the empirical analysis after some banks and countries exit the initial dataset 
due to winsorising the accounting data. In winsorising the data, observations which are above the 99.5 percentile 
and below the 0.5 percentile of the distribution are discarded from the sample. 
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whose solicitation status was converted to ‘unsolicited’, and the control group uses 29 
sovereigns whose S&P ratings remained solicited throughout the sample period (see Table 1). 
 
3.3. Rating events 
Rating events are identified using a comprehensive credit rating scale (CCR-58 point 
scale) which includes rating, watch and outlook status. Much recent literature identifies the 
importance of watch and outlook (e.g. Alsakka et al., 2014; Correa et al. 2014). Rating 
classes are assigned values from 1 to 58 such that: AAA = 58, AA+ = 55, …, CCC = 7, CCC- 
= 4, C/SD/CC/D = 1. For positive watch we add +2, for positive outlook +1, whereas for 
negative outlook and negative watch we subtract 1 and 2, respectively. 
Panel A of Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics for the monthly bank credit events. 
The grand total of monthly observations is 8900, where 5882 (3018) are observed pre (post) 
the regulation-induced disclosure of solicitation status (March 2011).13 In summary, there are 
516 events, consisting of 224 positive and 292 negative actions. The positive (negative) 
events in the pre-disclosure period amount to 1.75% (1.79%) of the grand total of monthly 
observations (see Column II). After solicitation disclosure rules were implemented by S&P, 
positive (negative) events for banks summed to 0.76% (1.49%) of the grand total of 
observations (see Column IV).  
Panel B of Table 2 presents the sovereign events. In total, the qualifying sovereigns faced 
71 positive and 83 negative rating events. The pre-disclosure phase yields positive and 
negative events in similar proportions (52 vs. 46 in Column I). They are distributed relatively 
evenly across the two groups of countries in the sample. In contrast, the post-disclosure phase 
reveals deteriorating ratings for the group of sovereigns whose ratings converted to 
                                                        
13 On 24th February 2011, S&P disclosed the unsolicited status on 14 of its sovereign issuers, while Argentina’s 
solicitation status was converted on the 4th April 2011. Because of the monthly data frequency utilised here, 
whereby ratings are observed on the 1st of each month, March 2011 onwards is the post-treatment period, but 
this is amended to be May 2011 for Argentina only. 
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unsolicited, with 2 upgrades and 13 downgrades. Countries which retain solicited ratings after 
that date have 17 positive versus 24 negative events (see Column III). 
The descriptive statistics (Panel A, Column VI) identify a strong ceiling effect which is 
observed for 97.1% of sample observations. 78.3% of bank ratings are lower than the relevant 
sovereign rating (B<S), 18.8% of bank ratings equal the sovereign rating (B=S), and bank 
ratings pierce the ceiling only in 2.9% of cases (B>S). Both bank and sovereign ratings are 
lower after March 2011, on average. In Panel A, the banks’ mean rating drops from 37.5 
(approx. BBB+) in the pre-disclosure period to 35.4 (approx. BBB) in the post-disclosure 
period. In Panel B, unsolicited sovereigns’ mean numerical ratings decline from 49.8 to 48.8, 
while solicited sovereigns’ mean numerical ratings drop from 38.6 to 37.3. Fig.1 plots annual 
sovereign ratings against bank ratings per country at the aggregated level. Fig.1 illustrates 
trends between sovereign and bank ratings for a sample of four countries which switch to 
unsolicited ratings. Bank ratings in this group rarely exceed those of the sovereign issuer. In 
the cases of France, Germany and Italy, both sovereign and bank ratings show a substantial 
decline in the first quarter of 2011 (the time of solicitation status disclosure).14  
 
4. Methodologies 
4.1. Univariate tests 
We test for differences in the financial profiles of the two groups of banks. To investigate 
this, we generate t-statistics of means for a number of covariates. These control variables are 
selected in line with prior research highlighting determinants of bank ratings and are also 
used in the multivariate analysis. Sovereign ratings are considered as a key factor determining 
bank ratings (e.g. Shen et al., 2012; Alsakka et al., 2014; Huang and Shen, 2015; Williams et 
                                                        
14 The timing of this effect is not coincidental with the downgrades of countries such as Portugal, Ireland, 
Greece or Spain, associated with events in the European debt crisis. See Section 6 for formal robustness tests 
relating to this point. Note that crisis-affected European countries appear in both the treatment and control 
groups. 
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al., 2015), while bank rating levels are included to control for the banks’ financial conditions 
and creditworthiness (see Section 2.1 for further details). Variables describing bank size, 
profitability, asset quality, capital adequacy and liquidity are found to be significant in 
explaining bank ratings (e.g. Caporale et al., 2012; Shen et al., 2012; Hau et al., 2013. Also, 
see Section 2.1 for more details). Further, we include the ratio of ‘non-interest-income to 
gross-revenues’ to control for the non-traditional intermediation activities of the banks in our 
sample. This considers whether banks which are oriented towards non-traditional 
intermediation activities (i.e. commission and fee generating activities, including trading and 
securitization, investment banking and advisory fees, brokerage commissions, venture capital 
and non-hedging derivatives activities) are more or less likely to be downgraded compared 
with banks which are mainly involved in traditional banking activities (deposit taking and 
lending functions of banks). It is well-documented that the profitability and risk of banks are 
affected by the extent of non-interest activities of the banks (e.g. Smith et al., 2003; De 
Jonghe, 2010; Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010). 
The summary statistics, abbreviations and definitions of variables used appear in Table 3. 
Following Poon (2003), when the covariate is an ordinal variable, we apply the Wilcoxon-
Mann-Whitney U test. To reduce the frequency of “0” in the sample, the lower frequency 
(annual) data is used in this exercise. The examples of covariates include change in bank 
ratings, banks’ mean ratings and financial variables and ratios. The null hypothesis is rejected 
for 6 (5) out of 7 covariates in the entire and post-disclosure (pre-disclosure) sample periods. 
This suggests that banks incorporated in the two groups of sovereigns have distinctive 
characteristics and are not balanced groups (see Table 4). Banks in the treatment group are 
characterised by lower returns on equity, lower loan loss reserves and higher total asset-to-
equity ratio, and their mean bank ratings are higher than those of the control group on 
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average. To address the differences in profiles across banks, we conduct a more detailed 
paired subsample test later in the paper (see multivariate analysis in Section 6.2).  
 
4.2. Ordered probit model        
 To test the hypothesis from Section 2.4, the ordered probit framework is employed. The 
methodology is widely used in the credit ratings literature because it accounts for the ordinal 
nature of the dependent variable. Eq. (1) captures the effect of an external and exogenous 
event (disclosure rules) which feeds through sovereign ratings and to the banks in the 
considered countries, as follows:         
t,j,it,j4t,j3sj,2j,t1t,j,i
YF*CFXBankRΔSovRTreatment)*Post(*y    
                                                         )1,0(N
t,j,i
                   (1)
       
tjiy ,,* is an unobserved latent variable connected to the ordinal responses of tjiy ,, ; change 
in rating of bank i in country j at month t based on the 58-point CCR scale and taking values 
of -3, -2, -1, 0, 1, 2, 3, by the measurement model:  
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The ),(  parameters of the regression as well as thresholds (α) are estimated using 
maximum likelihood (ML) estimation and are subject to the constraint α1<α2 <….<αJ. 
Treatment is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the country belongs to the treatment 
group; 0 otherwise.  
Post is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the observation is from the post-treatment 
period (March 2011 onwards for all countries, but May 2011 for Argentina); 0 otherwise. 
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This main interaction dummy (Post*Treatment) captures the impact of disclosure rules in the 
regression model. In line with the theoretical explanations of deflated unsolicited ratings (see 
Section 2.3) and economic intuition, the expected sign of this variable is negative. This is 
consistent with the notion that bank ratings in countries with unsolicited ratings might face 
more downgrades (and fewer upgrades) than the banks in the other group due to the rating 
ceiling effect.  
∆SovRj,s represents the change in sovereign CCR by S&P based on the 3-month window prior 
to month t (i.e. s = the t-3 to t window). It takes the value of -3, -2, -1, 0, 1, 2 or 3. The 
predicted sign of the coefficient is positive since bank ratings have the tendency to move in 
the same direction as ratings of their home sovereigns (e.g. Huang and Shen, 2015).  
BankRjt represents banks’ CCR taking values 1-58. This controls for the banking 
environment. The variable is expected to have a positive sign given that higher bank ratings 
result in higher probability of bank upgrades and lower probability of bank downgrades and 
vice versa.  
Xjt is the set of control variables relating to bank characteristics (see points 1-5 in Table 3).15 
CF is a full set of country dummy variables. 
YF is a full set of year dummy variables. 
 Further, we calculate the marginal effects (MEs) to estimate the economic significance of 
each independent variable on the probability of bank rating changes.  
 
 
                                                        
15 The correlation matrix (unreported) has been considered, and we find no reason for concern about 
multicollinearity among the control variables in Eq. (1). 
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5. Empirical results  
5.1. Baseline Model 
 Table 5 presents the results of Eq. (1). We discuss Model I initially. To account for 
unobserved differences in the economic development, industrialisation level or geographical 
bias concerning sovereigns, Model I includes year-country dummies. Interacting fixed effects 
became a more common practice in the recent empirical literature (e.g. Jiménez, Ongena, 
Peydró, and Saurina, 2012). This approach enables us to control for possible omitted variable 
bias which could result in endogeneity issues (Lemmon and Roberts, 2010). The interaction 
term accounts for any variation across the time and country spectrum, and controls for 
differences in the countries’ levels of development. The identification of macroeconomic 
conditions derives entirely from the interactions, in line with Thompson (2011) and Jiménez 
et al. (2012) who suggest that when fixed effects are used, one needs to drop the 
macroeconomic covariates from the regression because they become co-linear with the 
dummy variables. 
 The coefficient of Post*Treatment is significant with negative sign implying that the 
conversion of the sovereign status to unsolicited leads to higher probability of bank 
downgrades and lower probability of upgrades. Hence, ceteris paribus, banks which belong 
to the treatment group are more likely to be downgraded and less likely to be upgraded 
compared with banks not in the treatment group. The marginal effects analysis suggests that 
such banks are 1.85%, 0.93% and 0.79% more likely to be downgraded by 1, 2 and ≥ 3 CCR 
points respectively (see Table 6). The effect of the treatment dummy represents a strong 
marginal effect in comparison with the 3.28% (2.73%) of negative bank (sovereign) rating 
events observed in the entire data sample (see Table 2, Panel A (B), Column VI).    
 The estimated coefficients of ∆SovR and BankR are significant and economically relevant. 
The sign on both coefficients is in line with expectations and remains robust to inclusion of 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
20 
 
bank and/or monthly fixed effects. The positive sign on ∆SovR indicates the presence of the 
ceiling effect. Banks incorporated in countries which received a rating downgrade are more 
likely to be downgraded and less likely to be upgraded. The MEs suggest a sovereign rating 
upgrade by 1-CCR point increases the probability by 0.72%, 0.39% and 0.20% of a bank 
rating upgrade by 1, 2 and ≥ 3 CCR points and leads to reduced probability of downgrade by 
1, 2 and ≥ 3 CCR points by 0.85%, 0.38% and 0.28% (see Table 6, Panel A).16 The MEs of 
sovereign rating changes on bank rating changes should be considered in the context of the 
number of bank rating changes (the dependent variable) as a proportion of the total number of 
observations. Bank rating upgrades of 1-CCR, 2-CCR and >2-CCR points represent 1.30%, 
0.75% and 0.46% respectively of the observations (see Table 2, Panel A, Column VI). Bank 
rating downgrades of 1-CCR, 2-CCR and >2-CCR points represent 1.56%, 0.80% and 0.92% 
respectively of the observations (see Table 2, Panel A, Column VI). The positive sign of the 
BankR coefficient indicates that banks with higher credit ratings are more likely to be 
upgraded and less likely to be downgraded.  
 Apart from ln(Assets) and INCREV, the coefficients of the remaining explanatory 
variables are marginally or not significant although their signs are consistent with economic 
rationale. The results show that larger banks are more likely to be downgraded and less prone 
to become upgraded in this sample. We also find that banks with higher non-interest income 
ratios are more likely to be downgraded than banks which are mainly involved in traditional 
banking activities. This is consistent with the results of De Jonghe (2010) who finds that the 
shift to non-traditional banking activities increases banks’ systematic risk and thus reduces 
banking system stability, because interest income is less risky than all other revenue streams. 
                                                        
16 As robustness tests, we have re-estimated Eq. (1) using (i) a sub-sample excluding countries with a single 
bank in the sample, and (ii) a sub-sample excluding Japan (which has the highest number of rated banks and 
therefore might be overrepresented in the sample). The (unreported) results show that Post* Treatment remains 
negative and significant throughout all specifications with these differing sub-samples. 
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Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2010) also show that banks with higher levels of non-interest 
income engender a materially higher bank risk. 
 
5.2. Various fixed effect models 
Model I of Eq. (1) accounts for observed time-varying bank specifics (e.g. profitability 
measures, size, credit rating) and identifies the impact of observed and unobserved changes in 
macro-economic conditions through the year-country interaction dummy. However, the 
model could still be considered incomplete because it does not control for unobservable time-
variant bank heterogeneity (e.g. banks’ risks, quality and investment prospects, and access to 
finance) (see Petersen and Rajan, 1994). To address this issue,  Models II, III and IV in Table 
5 present the estimation of Eq. (1) using various fixed effect models and clustering options 
applied to the baseline Model I (following an approach similar to Jiménez et al., 2012).   
In Model II, we cluster on the bank level to test for firm effects. The inclusion of bank 
controls in the model addresses observable differences in banks’ profiles affecting rating 
changes but does not handle the unobserved effects which could be driving these differences 
and the dependent variable itself. Clustering on the bank level in the regression helps to 
correct for these omitted and possibly unobserved effects and confirms the randomisation of 
the treatment effect. The results are consistent with those of Model I. 
Model III tests whether any time effect is present, using month fixed effects applied to the 
baseline Model I. Monthly fixed effects apprehend variations in macroeconomic conditions 
such as shocks to the economy, inflation or interest rates. The coefficient on the treatment 
dummy remains strongly statistically significant with the expected negative sign. We applied 
clustering on the same level as the fixed effects (monthly) and find that the time effect is 
constant.17  
                                                        
17 The test following Petersen (2009) (not reported here) added month clustering to the month fixed effects. No 
substantial differences were observed among the standard errors. 
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In Model IV, we control for correlation between time and cross-section dimensions 
simultaneously (Faulkender and Petersen, 2006; Thompson, 2011). In addition to monthly 
dummies, from Model III, we cluster on the bank level. Monthly dummies eliminate the 
correlations between observations occurring at the same time intervals (time effects). This 
results in a ‘pure’ firm effect with unbiased standard errors (Petersen, 2009). We also include 
bank fixed effects. The coefficient on the treatment dummy in Model IV increases further (-
0.695). The negative sign of the coefficient once more confirms the robustness of our results 
and supports the underlying hypothesis. MEs suggest that banks in the treatment group are 
1.73%, 0.74% and 0.47% more likely to be downgraded by 1, 2 and ≥ 3 CCR points than 
banks in the other group (Table 6, Panel D). In terms of goodness of fit, the model improves 
compared to earlier versions (pseudo R2 of 0.214). The explanatory power also remains the 
highest (log likelihood of -2246), which suggests that this is the preferred model. 
 In brief, the results show that the effect of sovereign solicitation conversion is negative 
and statistically significant for those banks belonging to the group of sovereigns whose 
ratings are disclosed as unsolicited. Results remain robust across various specifications. 
 
6. Robustness tests  
6.1. Falsification tests 
 To link the impact of solicitation disclosure rules to the bank rating changes, we focus on 
the differences arising between the treatment and control groups. In this setting, one needs to 
rule out the possibility that any other events coincide with the adoption of the disclosure 
rules. This relates to the notion that changes (due to disclosure rules) should only be observed 
across banks incorporated in the treated countries and not for the opposite group or at a 
different time than the first quarter of 2011. To confirm that no undetected issues interfere 
with the results, we run a set of placebo regressions focusing on: (a) time spectrum variations 
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and (b) cross-sectional variations. To perform the first test, we run each of the Models I-IV, 
estimated in Section 5, with the treatment assigned to earlier dates than its true occurrence. 
Using this identification strategy, we find as expected that leads before the intervention yield 
insignificant results (Table 7- Model IV).18 This suggests that there are no potential 
unobserved events, which could be driving our results around the time at which the treatment 
is measured.  
    The second falsification test examines whether any unobserved effect, which could be 
driving the results, is due to a selection bias. We investigate whether the treatment yields 
significant results if the group which received it was altered. We examine whether the 
treatment, henceforth the placebo effect, received by the control group rather than treatment 
group is statistically different from zero (since the control group did not receive the 
treatment). We base this on randomisation on (i) bank19 and (ii) sovereign levels (see Table 
8).20 The vast majority of placebo estimates are insignificant, thus demonstrating that the 
initial findings remain robust and hold for the group in question only. 
 
6.2. Matching methods 
 The univariate analysis (Section 4.1) indicated some significant differences between the 
treatment and control groups prior to solicitation conversions. Using propensity score 
matching, we construct a sample which shares similar characteristics21 for both groups prior 
                                                        
18 In model IV, the leads are insignificant at 1, 2 and 3 months prior to the authentic event date (see Table 7). 
19 The random number generator in STATA assigns a placebo to a subset of banks from the control group. The 
placebo equals one when the (randomly assigned) bank in question belongs to the control group and if the 
observation is from the post-treatment period. The results of three trials are presented in Panel A of Table 8. 
20 The generator randomly selects a fraction of sovereigns belonging to the control group and assigns the 
placebo effect to all banks which operate in those sovereigns. Subsequently, replicated regressions with the 
placebo effect follow. As in the first instance, the treatment group is excluded from the sample. The results of 
three consecutive trials are presented in Panel B of Table 8. 
21
 These include: ln(Assets), Leverage, LLR/GL (described in Table 3); SOV20SCALE (BANK20SCALE): 
sovereign (bank) credit rating expressed in 20-notch scale; MEANCPI: mean CPI (Consumer Price Index) value 
per sovereign. Inflation is measured as average annual consumer price inflation growth on a year-over-year 
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to the treatment. According to Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985, p.41) the “propensity score is the 
conditional probability of assignment to a particular treatment given a vector of observed 
covariates”. For the conditional mean independence assumption to hold, the outcome variable 
must be independent of treatment bounded by the propensity score (Smith and Todd, 2005). 
Additionally, all variables which affect both the fact that the treatment is observed and the 
outcome of that treatment need to be included in the propensity score. 
  To the best of our knowledge, there is no literature examining the economics 
(determinants) of the sovereign solicitation status. The observable characteristics which could 
potentially persuade a government to seek a solicited rating (or remain unsolicited) might be 
triggered by the state of the national economy represented by inflation, among other factors. 
Nonetheless, there is a possibility that the treatment has impact on the factors which are 
selected to explain its phenomenon and therefore we fix them over time. We test the 
balancing assumption that the means of covariates in the opposing groups do not differ from 
each other after the matching (Rubin and Thomas, 1996). The results (presented in Table 9) 
confirm that all the covariates are insignificant in the matched cases. After the matching, 
there is significant reduction in bias.22 On average, covariate bias decreases by 90 per cent. 
 Subsequently, we re-estimate the ordered probit model where the bank rating change is a 
function of the propensity score, treatment dummy and previously used fixed effects (i.e. 
Models I-IV, Table 5). All tested models generate negative coefficients for the treatment 
dummy. The magnitude of the effect in Model I and II is akin to that in the unmatched 
sample. The regression approach confirms that the estimates used prior to the matching 
                                                                                                                                                                            
basis for the previous three years in per cent terms to correct for procyclicality. This method helps in eliminating 
the business cycle effect. MEANCPI is fixed over time. CPI data is obtained from DataStream. 
22 To confirm that the control group is sufficiently similar to the treatment group, it is required that the 
maximum difference between the propensity score of the two groups (caliper) does not exceed 1% in absolute 
value. The reported p-value of the difference in mean P-scores ranges between 0.113 and 0.821. 
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exercise robustly represented the economic significance of the effect of the solicitation 
disclosure on the studied sample.23  
   
6.3. Endogeneity issues 
 For the estimation of unbiased and consistent parameters, which allow a reliable inference, 
the possible sources of endogeneity need to be considered and minimised. We are interested 
to know whether the disclosure events were exogeneous with respect to bank rating changes. 
A potential concern could be that the negative rating events among banks (and sovereigns) in 
the pre-disclosure period were a reason for regulators to press for transparency on unsolicited 
ratings. The concerns which led to regulatory changes in our sample period could be justified 
if there were signs of the anticipated decline in the creditworthiness of banks and sovereigns. 
The descriptive statistics in Table 2 invalidate this explanation given that bank upgrades 
outweighed downgrades in the period prior to introduction of the disclosure rules. 
 Economic rationale further disqualifies the possibility that S&P converted the solicitation 
status on several sovereigns due to operations of banks incorporated in these countries. It is 
implausible that the bank rating changes would in any way affect the decision of the CRA 
since the ceiling effect is observed in 97.1 per cent of cases (see Column VI of Table 2). It is 
very rare to find bank rating actions which precede their home sovereign actions within a 
short time window. Similarly to Alsakka et al. (2014), we find no evidence whatsoever of a 
bank-to-sovereign rating channel. The motivation of the new disclosure rules was linked to 
better transparency, disclosure and presentation of credit ratings rather than anticipated 
declines in economic activity. To further reduce potential endogeneity concerns, we employ a 
propensity score matching procedure to identify statistically indistinguishable subsamples 
                                                        
23 A final robustness test estimates Eq. (1) using Ordinary Least Squares which takes the form of a difference-in-
difference (DID) estimation. Although the discrete nature of the dependent variable is best estimated with the 
ordered probit model, it became recent practice to use the OLS as an alternative method (e.g. Becker and 
Milbourn, 2011; Van Roy, 2013). The economic inference of estimated Eq. (1) does not change and the 
treatment effect remains negative and significant throughout all specifications.  
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characterised by bank and country covariates. The results remain robust (see Table 9, Section 
6.2). This paper is careful to address endogeneity and presents a rationale for the view that 
the treatment effect is an exogenous shock. 
 
7. Conclusions        
 The regulatory oversight of CRAs in Europe underwent significant reform with the 
introduction of the CRA I Regulation in September 2009 and assigning to ESMA the function 
of supervising and certifying CRAs across the EU from July 2011. In early 2011, as a 
consequence of Article 10 (5) of EU Regulation 1060/2009, S&P converted the solicitation 
status on several sovereigns to unsolicited. This paper considers whether the regulatory 
changes negatively affected bank ratings in countries whose sovereign ratings were converted 
to unsolicited. The dataset consists of S&P ratings of 147 listed banks from 42 sovereigns in 
Europe, Asia-Pacific and Latin America for January 2006-January 2013.  
 We find that banks incorporated in states whose ratings converted to unsolicited status 
demonstrate higher probabilities of rating downgrades and lower probabilities of rating 
upgrades in comparison to other banks. The results also suggest that sovereign rating 
downgrades adversely influence bank ratings through the rating channel. Among the existing 
theories of deflated unsolicited ratings, the concept of strategic conservatism is most 
plausible in explaining these findings. Specifically, a reduced information flow from issuers 
under the ‘unsolicited’ status could justify lower S&P ratings. The results are statistically 
robust and economically relevant. Several specifications with a number of fixed effects and 
clustering options are applied. The sign and significance of the effect remains unchanged. We 
apply several falsification tests to rule out the possibility that any other events coincide with 
the adoption of the regulation or that selection bias is present.  
 These findings fill a clear void in the literature by examining the effect of sovereign 
solicitation status on the banking sector. The synergy of three overlapping themes of research 
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reveals a phenomenon which has not been tackled by earlier theoretical nor empirical papers. 
The study contributes to research on unsolicited credit ratings by uncovering the significance 
of the solicitation status of sovereigns and its role in the domestic markets. In addition, the 
paper supplements recent empirical efforts examining the rating channel between sovereigns 
and banks. We find that the sovereign solicitation status matters for market participants in 
each country due to the rating ceiling effect. Last but not least, the paper incorporates the new 
EU regulatory changes imposed on CRAs and is one of the first to report its impact on 
relevant markets. 
 CRAs’ use of the sovereign-bank rating ceiling has surprisingly been rather neglected by 
researchers until quite recently (Borensztein et al., 2013; Williams et al., 2013; Alsakka et al., 
2014; Huang and Shen, 2015). It has also seemingly fallen under the radar of regulations to 
some extent. Similarly, rating solicitation has attracted wide attention in the corporate sphere 
(e.g. Poon et al., 2009; Bannier et al., 2010), but no attention whatsoever in sovereign rating 
research literature. In designing new disclosure requirements for CRAs in 2009-11 (with 
good intentions), EU regulators failed to connect the issues of unsolicited rating and 
sovereign-bank linkages. It is somewhat surprising that any consultation process failed to 
highlight this issue, but the lack of closely relevant academic research could be a contributing 
factor. This paper fills this void and identifies a clear case of an unintended consequence of 
regulatory disclosure. Future regulatory reforms need to be undertaken with caution as they 
might further aggravate the conditions for debt issuers. 
 The findings are also of importance to CRAs and market participants. There are obvious 
implications of how the sovereign rating methods influence the functioning of financial 
markets. Governments need to appreciate the consequences of their decision-making with 
regard to rating solicitations. 
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Table 1  
List of banks and sovereigns used in the sample 
Control group Control group Treatment group 
Austria Korea (Republic of) Argentina 
Erste Group Bank AG Industrial Bank of Korea Banco de Galicia y Buenos Aires SA 
Raiffeisen Bank International AG Woori Finance Holdings Co. Ltd Banco Hipotecario SA 
Bolivia Malaysia Banco Patagonia SA 
Banco Mercantil Santa Cruz SA Malayan Banking Berhad - Maybank Australia 
Chile Mexico Australia and New Zealand Banking 
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Chile Financiera Independencia, S.A.B. Sofom Bank of Queensland Limited 
Banco de Chile Norway Bendigo and Adelaide Bank Limited 
Banco de Credito e Inversiones - BCI DnB ASA Commonwealth Bank of Australia 
Banco Santander Chile Papua New Guinea Macquarie Group Ltd 
CorpBanca Bank of South Pacific Ltd. MyState Bank Limited 
China Peru National Australia Bank Limited 
Bank of China Limited Banco Continental-BBVA Continental Cambodia 
Bank of Communications Co. Ltd Banco de Credito del Peru ACLEDA Bank PLC 
Bank of Nanjing Banco Internacional del Peru - Interbank France 
China Construction Bank Corporation Scotiabank Peru SAA BNP Paribas 
China Merchants Bank Co Ltd Philippines Société Générale 
Czech Republic Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company Germany 
Komercni Banka Philippine National Bank Deutsche Bank AG 
Denmark Poland Deutsche Postbank AG 
Danske Bank A/S Bank Polska Kasa Opieki SA-Bank Pekao  India 
Jyske Bank A/S Powszechna Kasa Oszczednosci Bank  AXIS Bank Limited 
El Salvador Portugal  Bank of Baroda 
Banco Agricola Banco Comercial Português, bcp Bank of India 
Finland Banco Espirito Santo SA Canara Bank 
Pohjola Bank plc. Russian Federation HDFC Bank Ltd 
Sampo Plc Bank UralSib ICICI Bank Limited 
Georgia Credit Bank of Moscow Indian Bank 
Bank of Georgia International Bank of St Petersburg Indian Overseas Bank 
Greece JSC VTB Bank Italy 
Alpha Bank AE MDM Bank Banca Carige SpA 
Eurobank Ergasias SA PJSC Rosbank Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA- 
Piraeus Bank SA West Siberian Bank-Zapsibcombank Banca Popolare dell'Emilia Romagna 
Hong Kong  Spain  Banca Popolare di Milano SCaRL 
EON Credit Service (Asia) Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria SA Credito Bergamasco 
Hang Seng Bank Ltd. Banco de Sabadell SA Credito Emiliano SpA-CREDEM 
Hungary Banco Popular Espanol SA Intesa Sanpaolo 
OTP Bank Plc Bankinter SA Mediobanca SpA 
Indonesia  Sweden Netherlands 
Bank Negara Indonesia (Persero) - BNI Nordea Bank AB ABN AMRO Bank NV 
Bank Rakyat Indonesia (Persero) Tbk Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB ING Groep NV 
PT Bank CIMB Niaga Tbk Svenska Handelsbanken Singapore 
Ireland Thailand  Oversea-Chinese Banking Corporation  
Allied Irish Banks plc Bangkok Bank Public Company Ltd.  Switzerland 
Bank of Ireland Bank of Ayudhya Public Company Ltd Credit Suisse Group AG 
Kazakhstan Kasikornbank Public Company Ltd. UBS AG 
BTA Bank JSC Krung Thai Bank Public Company Ltd. Vontobel Holding AG-Vontobel Group 
Delta Bank Siam Commercial Bank Public Co. Ltd Taiwan 
Eurasian Bank Ukraine Chang Hwa Commercial Bank Ltd. 
OJSC Halyk Savings Bank of Kazakhstan Alfa Bank PJSC China Development Financial Holding  
Nurbank JSC Nadra Bank First Financial Holding Company  
  Fubon Financial Holding Co Ltd 
  Sinopac Financial Holdings 
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Table 1 – Continued. 
Treatment group 
United Kingdom Japan Japan 
Barclays Plc 77 Bank (The) Hokkoku Bank Ltd. (The) 
HSBC Holdings Plc Aozora Bank Ltd Hyakugo Bank Ltd. 
Lloyds Banking Group Plc Bank of Kyoto Joyo Bank Ltd. 
Royal Bank of Scotland Group Plc Chiba Bank Ltd. Juroku Bank Ltd. (The) 
Schroders Plc Chugoku Bank, Ltd. (The) Kagoshima Bank Ltd. (The) 
Standard Chartered Plc Credit Saison Co Ltd Keiyo Bank, Ltd. (The) 
 Daishi Bank Ltd (The) Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group Inc. 
 Daiwa Securities Group Inc Mizuho Financial Group 
 Gunma Bank Ltd. (The) Nomura Holdings Inc 
 Hachijuni Bank Orix Corporation 
 Higo Bank (The) Shinkin Central Bank 
 Hiroshima Bank Ltd Shinsei Bank Limited 
 Hitachi Capital Corporation Shizuoka Bank 
 
Notes: This table lists sovereigns and S&P-rated banks incorporated in these countries used for our analysis 
(January 2006 to January 2013). The treatment group consists of sovereigns whose solicitation status was 
converted to unsolicited whereas the control group consists of sovereigns whose S&P ratings remained solicited 
throughout the sample period. 
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Table 2 
Descriptive statistics of the data sample 
     
       Countries 42 No. of  "unsolicited sovereigns" 13  
No. of listed S&P-rated banks 147 No. of "solicited sovereigns" 29 
Column Number  I II III     IV V VI 
 
No. 
% of 
Grand total 
No. 
   % of 
   Grand total 
No. 
% of 
Grand total 
Panel A- Banks Pre-disclosure       Post-disclosure     Grand total 
       
Observations 5882  3018   8900  
Average numerical rating 37.54   35.36   36.80   
Upgrade by 1 CCR point 91 1.02% 25 0.28% 116 1.30% 
Upgrade by 2 CCR points 46 0.52% 21 0.24% 67 0.75% 
Upgrade by >2 CCR points 19 0.21% 22 0.25% 41 0.46% 
Downgrade by 1 CCR point 88 0.99% 51 0.57% 139 1.56% 
Downgrade by 2 CCR points 37 0.42% 34 0.38% 71 0.80% 
Downgrade by >2 CCR points 34 0.38% 48 0.54% 82 0.92% 
Positive events 156 1.75% 68 0.76% 224 2.52% 
Negative events 159 1.79% 133 1.49% 292 3.28% 
B>S 228 2.56% 34 0.38% 262 2.94% 
B=S 1031 11.58% 641 7.20% 1672 18.79% 
B<S 4623 51.94% 2343 26.33% 6966 78.27% 
 
      
 
Panel B- Sovereigns Pre-disclosure      Post-disclosure   Grand total 
    
Observations 2102 943 3045 
"Unsolicited" sovereigns 
Average numerical rating 49.81 
 
48.82 
 
49.51 
 
Upgrade by 1 CCR point 4 0.13% 1 0.03% 5 0.16% 
Upgrade by 2 CCR points 2 0.07% 1 0.03% 3 0.10% 
Upgrade by >2 CCR points 1 0.03% 0 0.00% 1 0.03% 
Downgrade by 1 CCR point 4 0.13% 6 0.20% 10 0.33% 
Downgrade by 2 CCR points 3 0.10% 4 0.13% 7 0.23% 
Downgrade by >2 CCR points 1 0.03% 3 0.10% 4 0.13% 
Positive events 7 0.23% 2 0.07% 9 0.30% 
Negative events 8 0.26% 13 0.43% 21 0.69% 
"Solicited" sovereigns 
Average numerical rating 38.63   37.31   38.22   
Upgrade by 1 CCR point 20 0.66% 8 0.26% 28 0.92% 
Upgrade by 2 CCR points 12 0.39% 5 0.16% 17 0.56% 
Upgrade by >2 CCR points 13 0.43% 4 0.13% 17 0.56% 
Downgrade by 1 CCR point 16 0.53% 7 0.23% 23 0.76% 
Downgrade by 2 CCR points 4 0.13% 5 0.16% 9 0.30% 
Downgrade by >2 CCR points 18 0.59% 12 0.39% 30 0.99% 
Positive events 45 1.48% 17 0.56% 62 2.04% 
Negative events 38 1.25% 24 0.79% 62 2.04% 
Notes: This table presents summary statistics for the credit rating dataset, which includes monthly bank (Panel 
A) and sovereign ratings (Panel B) by S&P including outlook and watch for 147 banks from 42 countries for 
pre- disclosure (January 2006 to February 2011) and post-disclosure (March 2011 to January 2013) periods. 
B=S, B < S, and B > S identify: banks rated the same as the sovereign, banks rated lower than the sovereign, and 
banks rated better than the sovereign, respectively. “Unsolicited” refers to sovereigns whose S&P rating status 
converted from solicited to unsolicited in 2011. Columns II, IV and VI refer to the percentage of the grand total 
of observations in Column V.    
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Table 3 - Summary statistics  
Notes: This table presents summary statistics, abbreviations and definitions of variables used in the univariate and multivariate analysis for monthly observations of the 
sample of 147 banks originating from 42 countries for the period January 2006- January 2013. “n” is the number of observations, “S.D.” is standard deviation. The sample 
represents a balanced panel data with regards to the dependent variable and main explanatory variables.  
Variable  Units Definition     n Mean S.D. Min P25 Median P75 Max 
Dependent variable 
       
 
  
∆BANK,j,t-1 +-{0,1,2,3} Change in bank ratings using CCR scale; coded as ordinal values: -3,-2,-1, 0, 1,2,3.  8900 -0.02 0.46 -3 0 0 0 3 
Independent variables 
       
 
  
Post*Treatment 0/1 Post dummy= 1 if the observation is from the post-treatment period; =0 otherwise. 8900 0.17 0.38 0 0 0 0 1 
  
Treatment dummy= 1 if the country belongs in the treatment group; =0 otherwise.  
     
 
  ∆SovR 
+-{0,1,2,3} Change in sovereign ratings using CCR scale; coded as ordinal values: -3,-2, -1,0,1,2,3. 8900 -0.05 0.72 -3 0 0 0 3 
BankR 1-58 Banks credit ratings expressed in CCR scale, taking values 1-58. 8900 36.80 10.19 1 31 40 43 55 
Bank characteristics 
          
 
  
1) Size              
    Ln(Assets) ($) ln Logarithm of book value of total assets 8900 18.12 1.87 13.3 17.18 17.99 19.42 22.06 
2) Leverage           
LEVERAGE multiple Total assets over equity 8900 15.16 6.75 2.59 10.63 14.33 17.92 47.50 
3) Profitability 
          
 
  
ROAE % Return on average equity: Net income over average equity 8900 9.96 11.85 -98.32      4.66 9.77 16.44 39.48 
4) Asset quality              
LLR/GL % Loan loss reserves to gross loans  8900 2.89 3.07 0.08 1.17 2.05 3.50 32.5 
5) Revenues              
INCREV % Non-interest income over gross revenue 8900 35.77 18.49 2.24 22.90 32.31 42.44 97.78 
           
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
35 
 
 
Table 4 
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney U test  
    
        
Variable 
 
No. of 
observations 
 
Sample period 
 
Mean 
(control) 
 
Mean 
(treatment) 
 
 
Difference 
 
p-value 
∆BANK 886 Whole 0 -0.128 0.128 0.085* 
∆BANK 486 pre-treatment -0.076 0.032 -0.108 0.539 
∆BANK 400 post-treatment 0.091 -0.328 0.419 0.002*** 
       
BankR 886 whole 32.976 40.039 -7.062 0.000*** 
BankR 486 pre-treatment 33.568 41.158 -7.590 0.000*** 
BankR 400 post-treatment 32.281 38.636 -6.355 0.000*** 
       
ln(Assets) 886 whole 17.447 18.740 -1.292 0.000*** 
ln(Assets) 486 pre-treatment 17.395 18.760 -1.364 0.000*** 
ln(Assets) 400 
 
post-treatment 17.508 18.714 -1.206 0.000*** 
       
LEVERAGE 886 whole 12.717 17.133 -4.415 0.000*** 
LEVERAGE 486 pre-treatment 13.313 17.798 -4.485 0.000*** 
LEVERAGE 400 post-treatment 12.018 16.299 -4.281 0.000*** 
       
ROAE  886 whole 12.494 7.578   4.915 0.000*** 
ROAE  486 pre-treatment 13.602 8.425   5.177 0.000*** 
ROAE 400 post-treatment 11.191 6.517   4.674 0.000*** 
       
LLR/GL 886 whole 3.611 2.384 1.226 0.000*** 
LLR/GL 486 pre-treatment 3.063 2.247 0.815 0.008*** 
LLR/GL 400  post-treatment 4.256 2.556 1.700 0.001*** 
       
INCREV 886 whole 33.674 38.007 -4.332 0.137 
INCREV 486 pre-treatment 34.585 37.539 -2.953 0.616 
INCREV 400 post-treatment 32.603 38.594 -5.991 0.085 
 
Notes: The table presents results of the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney U test where differences between financial 
profiles of sovereigns which converted (treatment) and did not convert (control) the solicitation status are tested 
with use of seven covariates for the pre-treatment (Jan 2006 to Feb 2011) and the entire period (Jan 2006 to Jan 
2013) using yearly data (see Section 4.1). See Table 3 for variable definitions.  
Significance levels are: *** p<1%, ** p<5%, * p<10%.   
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Notes: This table reports the estimated coefficients and robust t-statistics in parentheses from various 
specifications of the ordered probit model of Equation 1 (see Section 4.3). The credit rating dataset consists of 
monthly sovereign and bank ratings for 147 banks originating from 42 countries for the period January 2006-
January 2013. The dependent variable is ΔBANK. The variable definitions and summary statistics are presented 
in Table 3. Fixed effects are included (“Yes”), not included (“No”) or not applicable in given specification (“-”). 
The year-country fixed effect is the interaction term among the full set of country and year dummies. The month 
fixed effect is applied for every (but one) month during the sample period. Significance levels are: *** p<1%, 
** p<5%, * p<10%.      
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5 
Ordered probit model results 
    
      
Model 
variables 
 
(I) 
 
(II) 
 
(III) 
 
(IV) 
 
 
Post*Treatment -0.5998*** -0.5998*** -0.4536*** -0.6949*** 
 (-4.87) (-4.18) (-2.66) (-2.73) 
∆SovR 0.3989*** 0.3989*** 0.3945*** 0.3925*** 
 (12.81) (11.83) (11.66) (10.50) 
BankR 0.0488*** 0.0488*** 0.0357*** 0.1344*** 
 (6.30) (6.01) (4.99) (5.38) 
ln(Assets) -0.1667*** -0.1667*** -0.1461*** -0.6943*** 
 (-5.46) (-4.62) (-4.83) (-5.40) 
LEVERAGE 0.0047 0.0047 -0.0043 -0.0234* 
 (0.74) (0.81) (-0.74) (-1.75) 
ROAE -0.0008 -0.0008 -0.0022 -0.0108** 
 (-0.20) (-0.25) (-0.65) (-2.45) 
LLR/GL -0.0007 -0.0007 0.0053 -0.0159 
 (-0.07) (-0.09) (0.55) (-0.75) 
INCREV 0.0026* 0.0026** 0.0011 0.0027 
 (1.65) (2.42) (0.67) (0.47) 
Observations 8900 8900 8900 8900 
Log likelihood -2436 -2436 -2318 -2246 
Pseudo R2 0.149 0.148 0.189 0.214 
Number of clusters 
 
147 
 
147 
Year-country dummies 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank dummy 
 
No No No Yes 
Cluster by bank ID 
 
- Yes - Yes 
Month dummy - - Yes Yes 
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Table 6 
Marginal effects for Table 5 estimations 
 
 
       
 
      Marginal effect %  
Variables Coefficient t-value -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Panel A- MODEL I                   
Post*Treatment -0.599*** -4.87 0.79 0.93 1.85 -2.23 -0.76 -0.39 -0.18 
∆SovR 0.398*** 12.81 -0.28 -0.38 -0.85 0.21 0.72 0.39 0.20 
BankR 0.048*** 6.30 -0.03 -0.05 -0.10 0.03 0.09 0.05 0.02 
Panel B- MODEL II 
        Post*Treatment -0.599*** -4.18 0.79 0.93 1.85 -2.23 -0.76 -0.39 -0.18 
∆SovR  0.398*** 11.83 -0.28 -0.38 -0.85 0.21 0.72 0.39 0.20 
BankR 0.048*** 6.01 -0.03 -0.05 -0.10 0.03 0.09 0.05 0.02 
Panel C- MODEL III 
        Post*Treatment -0.453*** -2.66 0.31 0.46 1.08 -0.98 -0.51 -0.25 -0.11 
∆SovR  0.394*** 11.66 -0.16 -0.27 -0.69 0.09 0.59 0.30 0.14 
BankR 0.035*** 4.99 -0.01 -0.02 -0.06 0.01 0.05 0.03 0.01 
Panel D- MODEL IV 
        Post*Treatment -0.694*** -2.73 0.47 0.74 1.73 -1.98 -0.59 -0.27 -0.11 
∆SovR  0.392*** 10.50 -0.12 -0.22 -0.59 0.06 0.52 0.25 0.11 
BankR 0.134*** 5.38 -0.04 -0.08 -0.20 0.02 0.18 0.08 0.04 
 
Notes: This table presents the impact of three main variables on the probability of bank rating change (MEs: 
marginal effects) resulting from Equation 1 (see Table 5). Panels A, B, C and D present the MEs results from 
Models I-IV, respectively. Significance levels are: *** p<1%, ** p<5%, * p<10%. 
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Table 7 
Placebo effects - time variation (Model IV) 
 
    
Model (IV) (IV) (IV)  
Variables f1. f2. f3.  
 
Placebo 0.4204 -0.1481 -0.0460  
 
(0.99) (-0.60) (-0.26)  
∆SovR  0.3959*** 0.4026*** 0.4071***  
 
(10.80) (10.86) (11.10)  
BankR 0.1419*** 0.1450*** 0.1504***  
 
(5.56) (5.81) (5.87)  
ln(Assets) -0.6731*** -0.7187*** -0.7263***  
 
(-5.06) (-5.63) (-5.73)  
LEVERAGE -0.0215 -0.0206 -0.0248*  
 
(-1.54) (-1.46) (-1.78)  
ROAE -0.0130*** -0.0130** -0.0114**  
 
(-2.60) (-2.44) (-2.33)  
LLR/GL -0.0215 -0.0119 -0.0153  
 
(-1.54) (-0.54) (-0.66)  
INCREV 0.0026 0.0036 0.0039  
 
(0.43) (0.61) (0.66)  
 
       
Observations 8702 8512 8330  
Log likelihood -2215 -2165 -2119  
Pseudo R2 0.217 0.218 0.221  
Number of bank clusters 144
 144 144  
Year -country dummies Yes Yes Yes  
Bank dummy Yes Yes Yes  
Month dummy Yes Yes Yes  
 
Notes: The table presents the estimated coefficients and robust t-statistics in parentheses from results of 
falsification tests performed on Model IV of Equation 1 (seen in Table 5) using the ordered probit model 
estimation on the sample of 147 banks from 42 countries for the period January 2006 - January 2013 (see 
Section 6.1). The dependent variable is ΔBANK. f.1; f.2; f.3 are leads in which the treatment was assigned (1, 2 
and 3 months earlier than the disclosures were announced, respectively). This serves the purpose of a “placebo 
effect”. The variable definitions and summary statistics are presented in Table 3. The year-country fixed effect 
is the interaction term among the full set of country and year dummies. The month fixed effect is applied for 
every (but one) month during the sample period. Significance levels are: *** p<1%, ** p<5%, * p<10%. 
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Notes: The table presents the estimated coefficients and robust t-statistics in parentheses from results of 
falsification test performed on Model IV of Equation 1 (seen in Table 5) using the ordered probit model 
estimation on the sample of 147 banks from 42 countries for the period January 2006- January 2013 (see Section 
6.1). The dependent variable is ΔBANK. The variable definitions and summary statistics are presented in Table 
3. The test in Panel A randomly assigns the placebo to a subset of banks which belong to the control group 
sovereigns. The test in Panel B randomly selects sovereigns which belong to the control group and assigns 
placebo to all banks belonging in that subset. The results of three consecutive trials are presented in columns 1, 
2 and 3 of Panels A and B. The sample is restricted to the control group only and for this reason the number of 
observations is constant in all trials. The year-country fixed effect is the interaction term among the full set of 
country and year dummies. The month fixed effect is applied for every (but one) month during the sample 
period. Significance levels are: *** p<1%, ** p<5%, * p<10%. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8 
Placebo effects – cross-section variation (Model IV) 
   
 
 
Panel A                       
Subset of banks 
 
Panel B  
All banks 
Variables 
1 2 3 1 2 3 
Placebo 0.1421 -0.0687 -0.0328 -0.4805 0.5946 -0.2955 
 
(0.70) (-0.39) (-0.21) (-0.88) (1.40) (-0.70) 
∆SovR 0.3843*** 0.3849*** 0.3849*** 0.3851*** 0.3873*** 0.3833*** 
 
(7.73) (7.73) (7.74) (7.73) (7.75) (7.66) 
BankR 0.1475*** 0.1473*** 0.1482*** 0.1487*** 0.1466*** 0.1483*** 
 
(4.17) (4.12) (4.20) (4.33) (4.12) (4.24) 
ln(Assets) 0.5231 0.5376* 0.5299* 0.5233 0.6075* 0.4821 
 
(1.61) (1.67) (1.65) (1.63) (1.83) (1.50) 
LEVERAGE 0.0447** 0.0409* 0.0404* 0.0418* 0.0348 0.0445** 
 
(1.98) (1.87) (1.86) (1.92) (1.55) (2.01) 
ROAE -0.0028 -0.0026 -0.0031 -0.0029 -0.0053 -0.0019 
 
(-0.49) (-0.42) (-0.53) (-0.50) (-0.80) (-0.33) 
LLR/GL -0.0044 -0.0055 -0.0059 -0.0056 -0.0067 -0.0055 
 
(-0.20) (-0.25) (-0.27) (-0.25) (-0.30) (-0.25) 
INCREV -0.0101 -0.0101 -0.0099 -0.0099 -0.0096 -0.0101 
 
(-1.22) (-1.22) (-1.20) (-1.20) (-1.17) (-1.22) 
   
  
   
Observations 4050 4050 4050 4050 4050 4050 
Log likelihood -1119 -1120 -1120 -1119 -1118 -1119 
Pseudo R2 0.228 0.228 0.228 0.228 0.229 0.228 
Number of bank clusters 70 70 70 70 70 70 
Year-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank dummy  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 9  
Balancing test- Propensity Score Matching 
  
        
Variable 
 
 
Mean 
% bias 
 
 % reduct 
|bias| 
 
 
t-test 
                      Treated Control  t p>t 
 
SOV20SCALE 
Unmatched           
 
Matched                      
16.360 15.357 25.4     8.74 0 
  16.360 16.426 -1.7 93.4   -0.48 0.628 
                 
BANK20SCALE Unmatched  
          
Matched                      
13.598 12.845 24.5     7.94 0 
  13.598 13.752 -5.0 79.6   -1.59 0.113 
                 
ln(Assets) Unmatched  
 
Matched                      
18.673 18.009 37.4     12.76 0 
  18.673 18.734 -3.4 90.9   -0.99 0.322 
                 
LEVERAGE Unmatched  
 
Matched                      
16.283 14.923 20.9     7.2 0 
  16.283 16.118 2.5 87.9   0.72 0.470 
                 
LLR/GL Unmatched   
         
Matched                      
2.5377 2.9592 -15.1     -4.91 0 
  2.5377 2.5937 -2.0 86.7   -0.71 0.477 
                 
MEANCPI Unmatched  
 
Matched                      
2.2738 3.3611 -141.6     -39.8 0 
  2.2738 2.2716 0.3 99.8   0.23 0.821 
                 
 
 
Notes: The table presents results of a balancing exercise performed directly after the propensity score matching 
(see Section 6.2). The null hypothesis states that difference in means of covariates is equal to zero. Variable 
definitions and summary statistics are presented in Table 3. Additionally: SOV20SCALE (BANK20SCALE) is 
sovereign (bank) credit rating based on the 20-notch scale; CPI is the Consumer Price Index and MEANCPI 
takes the mean value per sovereign.  
We require that the difference between the propensity score of the control and treatment group (caliper) does 
not exceed 1% in absolute value therefore only covariates which fulfil this assumption are included in the score 
(ROAE and INCREV from our main regression analysis were excluded). 
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Fig. 1. Trends between sovereign and bank ratings (Four examples) 
Notes: This figure represents the trend between sovereign and bank ratings for a sample of four sovereigns from 
the treatment group during the sample period (January 2006 to January 2013). The sovereign (thick) line 
represents the sovereign rating while the bank rating (dash dot) line corresponds to the average rating of the 
listed financial institutions incorporated in that country. The dashed (vertical) line represents the timing of the 
regulatory change to disclose the solicitation status of the sovereign rating. The credit ratings scale is 
transformed into a 58-point rating scale. 
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France: sovereign vs. bank ratings
4
0
4
5
5
0
5
5
6
0
3
0
3
5
01
Ja
n2
00
6
01
Ja
n2
00
8
01
Ja
n2
01
0
01
Ja
n2
01
2
01
Ja
n2
01
3
01
Ja
n2
01
1
01
Ja
n2
00
9
01
Ja
n2
00
7
time
sovereign rating (mean) bank rating
Germany: sovereign vs. bank ratings
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Italy: sovereign vs. bank ratings
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United Kingdom: sovereign vs. bank ratings
